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Many workers with low levels of educational attainment immigrated to the United 
States in recent decades. Large inflows of less-educated immigrants would reduce 
wages paid to comparably-educated native-born workers if the two groups are 
perfectly substitutable in production. In a simple model exploiting comparative 
advantage, however, we show that if less-educated foreign and native-born workers 
specialize in performing different tasks, immigration will cause natives to reallocate 
their task supply, thereby reducing downward wage pressure. We merge 
occupational task-intensity data from the O*NET and DOT datasets with individual 
Census data across US states from 1960-2000 to demonstrate that foreign-born 
workers specialize in occupations that require manual and physical labor skills while 
natives pursue jobs more intensive in communication and language tasks. 
Immigration induces natives to specialize accordingly. Simulations show that this 
increased specialization might explain why economic analyses commonly find only 
modest wage and employment consequences of immigration for less-educated 
native-born workers across U.S. states. This is especially true in states with large 
immigration flows. 
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Abstract
Many workers with low levels of educational attainment immigrated to the United States in recent
decades. Large inﬂows of less-educated immigrants would reduce wages paid to comparably-educated native-
born workers if the two groups are perfectly substitutable in production. In a simple model exploiting com-
parative advantage, however, we show that if less-educated foreign and native-born workers specialize in
performing diﬀerent tasks, immigration will cause natives to reallocate their task supply, thereby reducing
downward wage pressure. We merge occupational task-intensity data from the O*NET and DOT datasets
with individual Census data across US states from 1960-2000 to demonstrate that foreign-born workers spe-
cialize in occupations that require manual and physical labor skills while natives pursue jobs more intensive
in communication and language tasks. Immigration induces natives to specialize accordingly. Simulations
show that this increased specialization might explain why economic analyses commonly ﬁnd only modest
wage and employment consequences of immigration for less-educated native-born workers across U.S. states.
This is especially true in states with large immigration ﬂows.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Immigration has signiﬁcantly aﬀected the US labor market during the last few decades, particularly increasing
the supply of workers with low levels of formal schooling. Economists continue to debate the wage eﬀects of
these large inﬂows on native-born workers. If workers’ skills are diﬀerentiated solely by their level of educational
attainment, and if the production technology and productivity of each type of labor are given, then a large ﬂow
of immigrants with limited schooling should change the relative scarcity of education groups, increase wages
paid to highly-educated natives, and reduce wages paid to less-educated ones. Borjas (2003, 2006) and Borjas
and Katz (2005) adopt this intuitive approach and use US national-level data to argue that immigration reduced
real wages paid to native-born workers without a high school degree by four to ﬁve percent between 1980 and
2000. Area studies by Card (2001, 2007), Card and Lewis (2007), and Lewis (2005), in contrast, employ city
and state level data and ﬁnd almost no eﬀect of immigration on the wages of less-educated native workers.
Moreover, they fail to ﬁnd evidence that natives respond to immigration by moving to areas with fewer foreign-
born workers. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) note that the eﬀect of immigration on native wages crucially depends
upon the degree of substitution between native and foreign-born workers within each education group. That
is, native and foreign-born workers of comparable educational attainment might possess unique skills that lead
them to specialize in diﬀerent occupations, which would mitigate natives’ wage losses from immigration.1 Lewis
(2005) argues that if technological adoption adjusts to the availability of diﬀerent types of labor, regions with
larger populations of less-educated immigrants might use less-educated labor more productively, which helps
avoid negative wage implications.
We advance this debate by developing a theory and performing empirical analysis to demonstrate how na-
tive and foreign-born workers with little formal education are imperfect substitutes in production. We argue
that less-educated workers specialize in diﬀerentiated production tasks. Immigrants are likely to have imperfect
language (or equivalently, “communication”) skills, but they possess physical (or “manual”) skills similar to
those of native-born workers. Thus, they have a comparative advantage in occupations requiring manual labor
tasks, while less-educated native-born workers will have an advantage in jobs demanding communication skills.
Immigration encourages workers to specialize accordingly. Importantly, language-intensive tasks earn a compar-
atively higher return and those returns are further enhanced by the increased supply of manual-intensive tasks
that complement them. Therefore, productivity gains from specialization coupled with the high compensation
paid to communication skills together imply that foreign-born workers do not create large adverse consequences
for wages paid to less-educated natives.
1Manacorda et. al. (2006) ﬁnd similar imperfect substitutability between native and immigrant workers for the UK. Other
important contributions to the literature on immigration and wages include Altonji and Card (1991), Borjas (1994, 1995, 1999),
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997), Butcher and Card (1991), Card (1990), Friedberg and Hunt (1995), Friedberg (2001), and
National Research Council (1997).
2We begin in Section 2 by describing a simple model of comparative advantage and incomplete specialization
of workers. Workers’ skill endowments imply that immigration reduces the compensation paid to manual tasks
and increases the compensation paid to communication ones. The complementary nature of the two skills and
the reallocation of native workers toward communication tasks favor wages paid to native workers. The eﬀects
compensate (in part or entirely) for the depressing eﬀect of immigration on the wage paid to manual tasks.
Section 3 describes data for the 50 US states (plus the District of Columbia) from 1960 to 2000 that we use
to test our model. Census occupation codes allow us to merge occupational characteristics with individual-level
data from the IPUMS Census microdata (Ruggles et. al. (2005)). To measure the manual and communication
skill intensity of occupations, we use two separate US Department of Labor datasets on job task requirements
— O*NET and its predecessor the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). O*NET measures the importance
of several physical (dexterity, coordination, and strength) and language (oral and written comprehension and
expression) abilities within each Census occupation code. Data values are based upon experts’ recent (post 2000)
assessments and therefore reﬂect the current use of skills across occupations. In contrast, the DOT identiﬁes the
intensity of skill use in occupations as measured in 1977 and 1991. We use DOT data assembled by Autor, Levy,
and Murnane (2003) as a robustness check for our O*NET results. Unfortunately, this dataset contains only
two measures of manual skills (Eye, Hand, and Foot Coordination and Finger Dexterity). More importantly, the
DOT variable that comes closest to measuring communication abilities (the performance of Direction, Control,
and Planning activities) encompasses many tasks in addition to language skills.2 Though this variable represents
a more broadly deﬁned set of “interactive” skills that deviates from our preferred measure of communication
intensity, it is likely a close proxy. Despite the limitations of each dataset and skill intensity measure, we are
conﬁdent in our ﬁndings since they are remarkably robust to both dataset choice and estimation strategy.
The empirical analysis in Section 4 strongly supports key implications of our theory. In states with large
inﬂows of less-educated immigrants: i) less-educated native-born workers shifted their supply toward commu-
nication tasks at a faster rate than in states with low immigration; ii) the total supply of manual relative
to communication skills increased at a faster rate than in states with low immigration; and iii) the compen-
sation paid to manual relative to communication tasks decreased more than in states with low immigration.
Less-educated natives have responded to immigration by leaving physically demanding occupations for language-
intensive ones. These results are upheld by two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions that instrument for the
variation of less-educated immigrants across states using two diﬀerent sets of exogenous variables, both of which
exploit the increased level of Mexican immigration as an exogenous supply shift. The ﬁrst instrument follows a
strategy similar to Card (2001), Card and Di Nardo (2000), and Cortes (2006) by using the imputed share of
Mexican workers (based upon 1960 state demographics and subsequent national growth rates) as a proxy for the
2The other variables in this dataset pertain to analytical or cognitive skills.
3share of less-educated immigrants in a state. The second set of instruments interacts decade indicator variables
with the distance of a state’s center of gravity to the Mexico-US border, its square, and a border dummy.
Given the positive wage eﬀect of specializing in language-intensive occupations, native-born task reallocation
has protected their real wages and mitigated losses due to immigration. In Section 5, we use our model and
empirical results to calculate the eﬀect of immigration on average wages paid to native-born workers with a high
school degree or less education. Task complementarities and increasing specialization among native-born workers
imply that the wage impact of immigration on less-educated natives, while usually negative, is very small for
the US overall. While less educated workers in some states such as Arizona and Texas still experience negative
wage eﬀects from immigration, in most states those eﬀects are either very small or even positive. Importantly,
the impact on diﬀerent groups of native workers diﬀers depending on their task supply response. We ﬁnd that
groups potentially more threatened by competition with immigrants (such as young or black workers) respond
more vigorously in their task specialization, neutralizing a larger part of the negative wage eﬀect. These ﬁndings
agree in spirit with those of Card (2001), Card and Lewis (2007), and Ottaviano and Peri (2006), while adding
a new angle to the structural frameworks used by Borjas (2003), Borjas and Katz (2005), and Ottaviano and
Peri (2006) to analyze the eﬀect of immigration.
2 Theoretical Model
We propose a simple general equilibrium model of comparative advantages in task performance to illustrate
the eﬀects of immigration on specialization and wages.3 We brieﬂy describe the model here, and provide more
detailed derivations and results in the Appendix. We will test the model’s qualitative implications in Section 4,
and use its structure and empirically-estimated elasticities to evaluate the eﬀects of immigration on wages paid
to less-educated native-born workers in Section 5.
2.1 Production
Consider an open economy (e.g., a US state) that combines two non-tradeable intermediates, YH and YL,i na













The parameter σ ∈ (0,∞) measures the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate goods, while
β and (1 − β) capture the relative productivity of YL and YH in the production of Y . Y is chosen to be the
3Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop an interesting theory of oﬀ-shoring that builds upon a process of international
task division. Autor and Dorn (2007) use a model of diﬀerentiated task performance to analyze the evolution of wages in the 1980s
and 1990s related to computer adoption. Those models have features similar to ours.
4numeraire, and we assume it is assembled by perfectly competitive ﬁrms that minimize costs and earn no proﬁts.
This ensures that the prices of YL and YH (denoted PL and PH) are equal to their marginal products.
The two intermediate goods are produced using diﬀerent skills. Low education workers (with total labor
supply equal to L)p r o d u c eYL, and high education workers (H)p r o d u c eYH. While CES production functions
combining the services of high and low education labor are widely used in economics,4 we add to the framework
by assuming that less-educated workers must perform two types of tasks (i.e., manual and communication
skills) to produce YL. Manual tasks require the use of physical skills such as dexterity, bodily coordination, or
strength. Communication tasks such as directing, managing, and organizing people requires mostly language
skills. Let less-educated workers supply M units of manual-task inputs and C units of communication-task
inputs in the aggregate. These tasks combine to produce YL a c c o r d i n gt ot h eCES function in Equation (2),
where βL ∈ (0,1) captures the relative productivity of manual skills and θL ∈ (0,∞) measures the elasticity of











Since we focus on the market for less-educated workers, we make the simplifying assumption that highly-
educated workers only perform one “analytical” task in the production of YH. By standardizing the units of
analytical tasks, we can simply assume that YH is produced according to a linear technology equal to the total
supply of highly-educated workers. That is, YH = H.
Competitive labor markets and perfect competition among producers of YL and YH yield the relative task
demand function in Equation (3), where wM and wC denote the compensation (rate of return) paid for one unit












2.2 Relative Supply of Tasks with Heterogeneous Workers
Since each highly-educated worker is identical from a productive point of view, the wage paid to these workers
equals the marginal productivity of YH in (1). That is, WH = PH. In contrast, less-educated workers are hetero-
geneous and diﬀer from each other in their relative task productivity. In particular, each agent j is characterized
by a speciﬁcl e v e lo fe ﬀectiveness in performing the two tasks. Let mj and cj represent the eﬀectiveness of worker
j in performing manual and communication tasks, respectively. The one unit of labor supplied by less-educated
worker j can be fully used to provide mj units of manual tasks or cj units of communication tasks. Workers
4See the literature on cross-country income diﬀerences (Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Caselli and Coleman (2006)), technological
change (Acemoglu (1998, 2002)), and labor economics (Katz and Murphy (1992), Card and Lemieux (2001)).
5with higher eﬀectiveness in a particular task will spend relatively more of their labor endowment performing it,
but we assume that decreasing returns imply that an agent will not choose to fully specialize.
Let lj be the share of personal labor endowment (share of time) worker j spends performing manual tasks
so that 1 − lj is the time spent performing communication tasks. Worker j’s supply of manual task units is
indicated by μj =( lj)
δ mj, while its supply of communication task units is ζj =( 1− lj)
δ cj. The parameter
δ ∈ (0,1) captures the decreasing returns from performing a single task. Each worker takes the return paid
to tasks as given and chooses an allocation of labor between manual and communication tasks to maximize its
labor income given in Equation (4).
WL,j =( lj)
δ mjwM +( 1− lj)
δ cjwC. (4)
By maximizing wages with respect to lj, we can identify the equilibrium relative supply of manual versus
communication task-units for worker j (Equation (5)), which depends positively on relative task compensation














Aggregate task supply simply equals the summation over all less-educated workers. That is, M =
P
j μj =
Lμ and C =
P
j ζj = Lζ,w h e r eμ and ζ represent the average unit-supply of manual and communication tasks.
Aggregate relative task supply (Equation (6)) is then a function of relative wages and the average relative








































In equilibrium, relative task provision (Equation (8)) is a positive function of both the relative productivity
of the tasks in the production of YL and the average relative eﬀectiveness of workers. An increase in βL raises M
C




raises supply. Relative compensation (Equation (9)) is also a positive function




; a population that is more eﬀective in manual task performance (on
average) would supply more of those tasks, thereby decreasing their relative price.
5In practice (and in anticipation of our empirical strategy), workers are likely to select diﬀerent allocations of their time between
manual and communication tasks according to their occupation choice. Thus, we assume each unique allocation represents a
diﬀerent occupation. A worker will choose an occupation with the time allocation (l,1 − l) that maximizes its wage income, which
depends on its relative eﬃciency (mj/cj) of task performance. For given relative wages, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between relative eﬃciency and occupation choice, as well as between relative eﬃciency and the relative supply of tasks (Equation



























All workers receive the same relative task compensation in equilibrium. Equation (10) identiﬁes an indi-
vidual worker’s relative supply of tasks, which is positively related to its eﬀectiveness in performing them. In
contrast, the average worker’s relative eﬀectiveness will negatively aﬀect an individual’s supply. This is because
a population with higher manual abilities would supply more units of manual tasks and depress its relative


















The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the relative task wage and provision for an economy. Bold lines
represent (in logarithmic scale) aggregate relative task supply and demand. Point E0 identiﬁes the equilibrium
corresponding to Equations (8) and (9). Dotted lines to the left and right of the aggregate supply curve represent
relative individual task supply for workers j1 (with low manual eﬀectiveness) and j2 (high manual eﬀectiveness).
The equilibrium supply for each type of worker is identiﬁed by the point where its individual supply curve crosses
the level of equilibrium compensation (at points 1 and 2, respectively). Intuitively, an increase in βL would shift
aggregate demand to the right, increase the equilibrium relative compensation for manual tasks, and increase




would shift aggregate supply to the
left, decrease the relative compensation for manual tasks, and reduce the relative supply of manual tasks for
each worker of a given relative eﬀectiveness.
If we assume that workers also spend their entire wage income to consume Y in each period (there is no
capital in the model so we assume no saving and investment), the equilibrium compensation values WH,w M,
and wC fully determine the income, task supply, and consumption of each agent. Hence, the model is a simple
general equilibrium static representation of a state’s economy.
2.3 Two Types of Workers: Eﬀects of Immigration on Relative Task Supply and
Returns to Tasks
The model in Section 2.2 analyzes average wages and task provision for a single group of heterogenous workers.
In this section, we expand the model to incorporate a second heterogenous group that diﬀers from the ﬁrst




. Suppose the initial group of less-educated “domestic” (or





. Now allow immigration so that a new group






force. While there is no clear reason for immigrants to be less productive in performing manual tasks, they
are certainly not as proﬁcient as natives in communicating with other native-born workers and other tasks










so that foreign-born workers
have, on average, comparative advantages in performing manual tasks, while native workers have comparative
advantages in performing communication tasks.6 This assumption allows us to analyze how immigration aﬀects
wages and task provision.
Equation (3) continues to describe relative aggregate demand. Equation (11) represents the relative supply













The term f = CF/(CF+CD) ∈ [0,1] is the share of communication tasks supplied by foreign-born workers. It
is a simple monotonically increasing transformation of the foreign-born share of less-educated workers, LF/(LF+
LD). Hence, the aggregate relative supply of tasks in the economy is a weighted average of each group’s supply,
and the weights are closely related to the share of each group in employment. The relative supply for foreign and















(12) describes the equilibrium relative compensation of tasks when the average manual versus communication













































By substituting this wage equilibrium into aggregate relative supply (6) for domestic workers, we ﬁnd their





































































The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium in an economy with native and foreign-born labor.
6We make no formal assumptions regarding whether one group has an absolute advantage in both tasks.
8Immigrants’ supply is to the right of domestic workers’ supply due to their comparative advantage in manual
tasks. The overall relative supply (represented by the thickest line in the panel) is a weighted average of the
t w o—t h ed i s t a n c eo ft h ea v e r a g es u p p l yc u r v ef r o mt h o s eof immigrants and domestic workers is proportional
to f and 1 −f, respectively. An increase in the share of foreign-born employment (which would raise f)w o u l d
shift the overall relative supply closer to that of foreign-born workers. Point E1 represents the equilibrium with
immigrants, while E0 is the equilibrium with no immigrants. From the comparison of those two equilibria we
can state the following four qualitative implications of our model that are proved using equations (12), (13),
and (14) in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1 The comparative advantage of foreign-born workers in performing manual tasks implies that
they supply relatively more manual versus communication tasks than domestic workers provide: MF
CF > MD
CD .
Proposition 2 As the foreign-born share of less-educated workers in an economy increases from zero (only








decreases. (This eﬀect is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1 by the shift of native
workers’ relative supply from E0 to D.)
Proposition 3 As the foreign-born share of less-educated workers in an economy increases from zero to pos-





increases. (This eﬀect is illustrated by the shift of aggregate workers’ relative supply from E0 to E1.)
Proposition 4 As the foreign-born share of less-educated workers in an economy increases from zero to positive







decreases. (This eﬀect is also
illustrated by the shift from E0 to E1.)
These qualitative implications provide the basis for comparing economies diﬀering from each other in the
presence of foreign-born workers in our empirical analysis. We ﬁrst check the validity of the comparative
advantage assumption and the inequality expressed Proposition 1. Then we test the qualitative predictions of
Propositions 2-4 using data for US states from 1960-2000.
Notice also that an increase in the average relative skill among immigrants, which we take as exogenous,
would have very similar eﬀects to those of an increase in the foreign-born share. Speciﬁcally, from conditions





would decrease the compensation paid to manual




















overall. Section 3 will





have been rising together over time and are likely to reinforce
each other.
92.4 Eﬀect of Immigration on Real Wages
In addition to establishing the aforementioned qualitative implications for relative task supply and rates of
return, our model can also simulate immigration’s eﬀect on the average wage of highly-educated and less-
educated native-born workers. To do so, we must ﬁrst estimate the production parameters (particularly σ and
θL) and immigration’s eﬀect on native-born task supply.
Since the equilibrium price of factors and intermediate goods are equal to their marginal productivity from
(1) and (2), we can derive the change in wages paid to highly educated workers (WH)a n di nt h ep r i c eo f
the intermediate low-education intensive good (PL) in response to changes in their supply. These values are




is the income share paid to highly-educated










































The percentage change in the supply of the intermediate good, ∆YL
YL , is related to the change in task-supply
of less educated workers by Equation (17), where κM =( wMM/PLYL) is the manual task share of wages paid













Equation (15) provides a direct measure of immigration’s eﬀect on wages of highly-educated native labor. To
obtain the eﬀect on wages paid to native less-educated workers, however, we must consider two channels. First,










tasks and then weight those changes by the initial (pre-immigration) average task supply of natives
(μD and ζD).8 Second, we need to account for the change in the eﬀective supply of natives’ manual and





wC. Altogether, Equation (18) expresses the net eﬀects of immigration on average wages
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Second Channel
(18)





wC are given by Equations (35) and (36) in Appendix A.4.
10Importantly, there are two reasons why this model predicts a less negative (or more positive) wage eﬀect than
in models that assume perfect substitution between natives and immigrants within education groups. First,





due to the increased supply of manual skills from immigrants
is negative and larger in absolute value than the impact on ∆wC
wC (which may be positive for complementarity
reasons), it is weighted by the relative task supply of natives. This weight is smaller than the relative supply
of the average individual, because the average includes immigrants. Hence, the negative contribution from that
term is smaller for less-educated natives than it is for the average less-educated worker. Second, the predicted
reallocation of tasks implies that ∆μD < 0a n d∆ζD > 0 so that if the communication task supply response
is larger than the response of manual task supply, and if wM
W D < wC
W D (both conditions are theoretically and
empirically true), then the second channel would contribute to an increased average wage paid to domestic
less-educated workers.
Finally, Expression (18) can be used to evaluate how the wages paid to any sub-group G of less educated
workers responds to immigration, as long as we substitute the measures of task supplies and their estimated
response to immigration for that group (μG, ζG, ∆μG, and ∆ζG) into the formula. In Section 5, we calculate
the impact of immigration on wages paid to less-educated native black workers, female workers, workers below
40 years of age, and workers with no high school experience.
3 Data Description and Preliminary Evidence
This section describes how we construct measures of task supply to test the main implications of the model. The
IPUMS dataset by Ruggles et. al. (2005) provides individual-level data on personal characteristics, employment,
wages, immigration status, and occupation choice.9 As consistent with the literature, we identify immigrants
as those who are born outside of the United States and were not citizens at birth. To focus on the period of
rising immigration and on Census data only, we consider decennial years from 1960 to 2000. We include only
non-military wage-earning employees who were between 18 and 65 years of age and had worked at least one week
in the year prior to the Census year. Whenever we construct aggregate or average variables, we weight each
individual by his/her personal Census weight, multiplied by the number of hours he/she worked in a year.10
This allows us to diﬀerentiate between part-time and full-time work, and to create variable values reﬂecting the
amount of hourly labor individuals actually supply.
Since the immigrant share of employment varies greatly across US states, we adopt states as the econometric
unit of analysis.11 One critique of this approach is that US states are open economies, so the eﬀects of immigra-
9Data downloaded on December 13, 2007.
10The number of hours worked in a year equals the number of weeks worked in the year (measured by the IPUMS variable
wkswork2 in 1960 and 1970 and wkswork1 from 1980-2000) times the number of hours usually worked (hrswork2 in 1960 and 1970
and uhrswork subsequently).
11Also see Card (2001, 2007), Lewis (2005), Card and Lewis (2007), Cortes (2006), and Kugler and Yuksel (2006).
11tion in one state could spill into others through the migration of natives. Section 4.1.5, however, notes that most
of the literature (including some of our previous studies) ﬁnds little evidence that natives respond to immigra-
tion through interstate migration or by exiting employment. Instead, our analysis provides a new explanation
for the observed small wage and employment response to immigration across states — native-born workers partly
protect themselves from competition with immigrants by specializing in language-intensive occupations.
3.1 Task Variables
We use two datasets to measure the task intensity of each occupation. By merging occupation-speciﬁct a s k
values with individuals across Census years, we are able to obtain aggregate task supply measures for natives
and immigrants by education level and state over time.
Our ﬁrst source of information on occupation characteristics comes from the US Department of Labor’s
O*NET abilities survey.12 Initiated in 2000, this dataset assigns numerical values to describe the importance of
52 distinct employee abilities (which we refer to as “tasks” or “skills”) within each SOC (standard occupation
classiﬁcation) occupation. We merge these occupation-speciﬁc values to individuals in the 2000 Census using
the SOC codes. The arbitrary scale of measurement for the task variables encourages us to convert the values
into percentiles. We assume that the 2000 Census is collectively representative of the US workforce, and then
rescale each skill variable so that it equals the percentile score representing the relative importance of that
skill within an occupation in 2000.13 Since Census occupation codes vary across years, we then assign these
O*NET percentile scores to individuals from 1960 to 2000 using the IPUMS variable occ1990, which provides
an occupational crosswalk over time. The standardization of skill values between zero and one should facilitate
a more intuitive interpretation of their percentage changes over time.
We use only a subset of the O*NET abilities dataset — eight diﬀerent measures of physical skill intensity
and four measures of language intensity (Table 1 provides a list of the variables used, organized by skill type
and sub-type). The remaining O*NET ability variables largely pertain to cognitive, analytical, and social
dimensions that are not directly related to physical or language skills (and are likely to be more relevant for
highly-educated workers). Thus, we do not include them in our analysis.
T h es e c o n dd a t a s e tw eu s ei st h ep r e c u r s o ro fO*NET,t h eDictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), which
periodically evaluated the tasks required for more than 12,000 occupations. Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)
(hereinafter ALM) organized information about ﬁve diﬀerent skills for each of the two most recent versions (1977
and 1991) and then merged it with Census Occupation Codes (COC) to analyze how the diﬀusion of computers
has altered the task supply of workers from routine to non-routine tasks.14 We use the ALM crosswalk to match
12The survey is publicly available at: http://www.onetcenter.org/
13That is, an occupation with a score of 0.02 for a speciﬁc skill indicates that only 2% of workers in the US in 2000 were using
that skill less often. The distribution of workers in 2000 used to construct percentiles does not weight individuals by hours worked.
14We are extremely grateful to David Autor for providing the data, which has also been used recently by Bacolod and Blum
12DOT task variable values with individual demographic information in the Censuses from 1960 to 1990. Changes
in the Census occupation classiﬁcation scheme preclude us from matching the ALM data to the 2000 Census,
so we instead use CPS data from 1998, 1999, and 2000 to collectively represent 2000.
The advantage of DOT data is that it relies on skill intensity assessed at the time of the data collection.
It might therefore more closely represent the skills required for occupations in earlier years (i.e., Census years
closer to the survey publication date). The limitation is that ALM only organize ﬁve variables. Two address
manual skills — Eye, Hand, and Foot Coordination (EHF)a n dFinger Dexterity (FingDex). ALM describe
EHF as the “Ability to move the hand and foot coordinately with each other and in accordance with visual
stimuli.” It maintains high values in occupations that demand physical precision (including dancers, athletes,
and ﬁreﬁghters). High FingDexvalues occur in jobs requiring intensive use of ﬁnger and hand dexterity (such
as drivers or tailors). The lowest for both variables occur primarily in white-collar professions.
Though the ALM dataset does not measure communication or language skills directly, their Direction,
Control, and Planning (DCP) variable measures the broader notion of an occupation’s interactive skill content.
ALM deﬁne DCP as “adaptability to accepting responsibility for the direction, control, or planning of people
and activities.” The highest DCP values occur for managerial occupations requiring non-routine language and
interpersonal skills, while the lowest are found among traditional blue-collar laborers. The remaining two skills
used by ALM (General Education Math and Sets Limits, Tolerance, or Standards) relate more to cognitive and
analytical skills, so we do not consider them in our analysis. Finally, we follow a similar approach to ALM by
rescaling the task variable values into percentiles based upon the 1960 distribution of workers.15
In most of our analysis we use the richer O*NET data. Unless noted otherwise, we average all (eight) manual
skill measures to obtain the average supply of physical tasks by an individual, μ, and we average all (four)
communication skill variables to obtain ζ.T h e nw ec a l c u l a t eMF and MD as the aggregate state level supply
of manual skills for foreign and native-born workers, respectively. Similarly, CF and CD are the state aggregate
values of the communication skill variables. Thus, our measures of a group’s manual and communication skill
supplies are more accurately the supplies inferred by the occupational distribution of that group.16
(2006) to analyze skill premia and the gender wage gap, and by Bacolod et al. (2006) to analyze the eﬀect of urban agglomerations
on the premium of speciﬁc skills. For more details on the construction of the variables, we refer to the Appendix of Autor, Levy
and Murnane (2003).
15Note that DCP and EHF refer to non-routine tasks (as deﬁned in ALM) and their supply was not directly displaced by the
adoption of computer technology. However FingDexis a skill used in routine manual tasks and its supply might have been aﬀected
by computer adoption and mechanization. As technological change can still confound the relative supply of tasks we control for it
in our empirical analysis.
16We also perform regressions using the DOT data for robustness, using the interactive skill value DCP in lieu of an exclusive
measure of language skills.
133.2 Aggregate Trends and Stylized Evidence
This section brieﬂy describes how diﬀerent occupations rank in their use of physical versus language skills
a c c o r d i n gt ot h eO*NET task variables. Table 2 lists representative occupations at diﬀerent deciles of the
distribution of relative manual-communication skill intensity. As we might expect, M
C values are lowest among
sales representatives, secretaries, and organizational occupations, while drivers, electricians, and builders score
among the highest (Table 1A provides values of the relative intensity for all occupations). Table 3 shows the
skill intensity for the occupations (with more than 25,000 less-educated workers in each year) maintaining the
most extreme skill diﬀerentials. It also reports the foreign-born share of workers with a high school degree or
less schooling. One striking fact is that the foreign-born share increased an average of four percentage points
between 1970 and 2000 in occupations with low manual versus communication task content, while it gained
an average 22 percentage points in those with high M
C values. As we only consider less-educated workers, the
educational distribution of immigrants cannot explain this large diﬀerence.
Figure 2 reports the aggregate relative supply of manual versus communication tasks for less-educated native
and foreign-born workers in each decade between 1960 and 2000. First, in accordance with Proposition 1 of
Section 2.3, foreign-born workers with a high school degree or less have provided, on average, more manual
relative to communication tasks than similarly educated natives did. The exception is in 1960 when immigrants
were at a historical minimum and the two groups provided approximately the same level of relative skills.
Second, the gap in relative task supply between native and foreign-born workers has increased signiﬁcantly
over time. By 2000, the relative supply among immigrants was 25% higher than among natives. This is due
to two phenomena — the increase in the share of recent immigrants among the foreign-born and the increased
relative supply of manual tasks by recent immigrants. Third, less-educated native workers have decreased (if
only slightly) their M
C supply. This trend is opposite of that among immigrants, suggesting that immigration
constituted a signiﬁcant exogenous change in skill supply rather than a response to modiﬁed skill demand.
Considering that the share of immigrants among less-educated workers grew substantially during the forty
years analyzed, and that immigrants’ relative specialization in manual tasks increased, the aggregate trend is
consistent with our second proposition. Native-born workers progressively left physical labor occupations and
adopted language-intensive ones as immigrants increasingly satisﬁed the demand for manual skills.
Using the DOT variables, Figure 3 shows a diﬀerent representation of the same phenomenon. This ﬁgure
plots the foreign-born percentage of workers with a high school education or less for each Census year in
occupations with high (above the median) and low (below the median) values of manual versus communication
intensity. Two facts emerge. First, occupations with high M
C values have always attracted a larger share of
foreign-born workers. Second, this tendency has become much stronger over time so that in 2000, 20% of less-
educated workers in high M
C occupations were immigrants, while only 11% were foreign-born in occupations
14with low relative skill intensity.
Finally, Figure 4 provides stylized evidence on the systematic association between immigration and native
workers’ behavior across states. It plots the foreign-born share of less-educated workers and the level of manual
versus communication tasks supplied by less-educated native workers for each state in 2000. While this does
not control for any other factors, the negative correlation is clear and very strong (a coeﬃcient of -0.59 and
standard error equal to 0.07). In states with a higher share of immigrants among less-educated workers, native
workers performed signiﬁcantly more communication relative to manual tasks. The empirical analyses of the
next sections test whether part of this remarkable diﬀerence in specialization of native workers across states is
due to immigration and how this might aﬀect wages paid to native-born workers.
4 Empirical Results
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrated the validity of Proposition 1 by conﬁrming that the relative supply of manual
versus communication tasks by foreign-born workers at the national level was larger than the relative supply
among native workers in each Census year since 1970. This tendency also characterizes the overwhelming






in 96% of the state-year observations in which more than 5% of less-educated employment was
foreign-born. This phenomenon holds for all observations in which more than 10% of less-educated workers was
foreign-born.
The remainder of this section tests whether Propositions 2-4 of Section 2.3, which were derived from our
comparative advantage assumption, are also valid. Section 4.1.1 assesses the correlation between the foreign-
born share of less-educated workers and the relative supply of tasks by native workers across states (Proposition
2). Instrumental variable regressions in Section 4.1.2 show that immigrant inﬂows cause natives to specialize.
Section 4.1.3 performs robustness checks by using the DOT variables and by controlling for exogenous demand
factors. Section 4.1.4 analyzes the impact of immigration on the task specialization of speciﬁc demographic
groups of native workers. Section 4.2 tests the eﬀect of immigration on the aggregate supply of relative tasks
across states (Proposition 3), and Section 4.3 quantiﬁes the eﬀects of immigration on the relative compensation
of manual and communication tasks (Proposition 4).
4.1 The Native-Born Worker Response to Immigration
4.1.1 Immigration and the Relative Task Supply of Natives
The wage implications of immigration in our theoretical model hinge upon the task-specialization response of
domestic workers to the inﬂow of immigrants. The regressions in this section examine the association between
15less-educated immigrants and the task supply of similarly educated native workers across states (s)a n dt i m e( t).
We begin by testing the second qualitative implication of Section 2.3 by estimating Equation (19), weighting







= αs + τt + γ (Share foreign L)st + εst (19)







and (Share foreign L)st represents the foreign-born share of less-educated employment.17 We control for year
(τt)a n ds t a t e( αs) ﬁxed eﬀects, and εst represents a non correlated zero-mean disturbance. If γ is negative,
then Proposition 2 holds and native-born workers respond to immigration by specializing in occupations less
physically demanding but more language intensive.18 We can go beyond the simple test of Proposition 2,
however, and determine whether immigration has a stronger relationship with the average native-born supply
of manual (μD) or communication (ζD) tasks by separately estimating Equations (20) and (21).19
ln(μD)st = αM
s + τM








t + γC (Share foreign L)st + εC
st (21)
We ﬁrst investigate the relationships in regressions (19), (20), and (21) by least squares. Table 4 presents
the estimates of γ, γM,a n dγC for diﬀerent samples and diﬀerent variable deﬁnitions.20 Columns (1) and
(2) use the average of all eight manual and four language ability O*NET variables to construct skill supply.
Columns (3) and (4) measure manual skills with the dexterity variables, and communication skills with the
oral language variables. Columns (5) and (6) include only coordination skills for manual abilities, and written
language skills for communication abilities. Finally, Columns (7) and (8) measure manual skills with physical
strength, and communication skills with all four language abilities. We use the full sample (ﬁfty states plus
D.C. over 1960-2000) in odd numbered speciﬁcations. Even numbered speciﬁcations exclude California — home
to 30% of all immigrants and the largest economy in the sample — to ensure that this outlier is not driving the
estimated correlations.
Three important results emerge. First, the estimates of γ uphold Proposition 2. The coeﬃcients are negative,
17Throughout the empirical analysis (except when noted), employment is measured in hours. Thus, (Share foreign L)st measures
the foreign-born share of hours worked by less-educated employees. Results from regressions using data weighted by individuals
(rather than hours worked) are quite similar and available upon request.
18We will verify that this association is causal in the following sections. For example, omitted demand characteristics (such
as sector composition or technology) speciﬁc to state-year observations might induce spurious correlation. We will address this
problem in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 by devising an instrumental variable strategy and explicitly controlling for sector-driven demand
changes and technological growth.
19Recall that μD =
MD
LD and ζD =
CD
LD .











,i tm u s tb ea l s ot r u et h a tγ = γM − γC.
16between -0.15 and -0.22, and usually signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level. The estimates in Column (1) suggest
that a one percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share of less-educated workers is associated with a 0.17%
decline in the relative supply of manual versus communication tasks among natives. Second, this decrease is
primarily achieved through a rise in the supply of language skills, rather than a fall in natives’ supply of
physical labor. The estimate of γC in Column (1) implies that a one percentage-point increase in the foreign-
born share is associated with a signiﬁcant 0.14% rise in natives’ supply of communication tasks. The estimates
of γM imply that native supply of manual tasks would only decline by 0.03% and the value is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. A large inﬂow of immigrants performing manual tasks is associated with increased demand
for complementary communication tasks that natives provide. Third, the results are robust — the signiﬁcant
correlations generally do not depend upon the diﬀerent task deﬁnitions and sample selection.
4.1.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
To argue that our estimates of γ represent the native-born task supply response to immigration, we need to
ensure that the cross-state variation of less-educated immigrants is mostly driven by supply shifts. One concern
is whether unobserved technology and demand factors, which may diﬀer across states due to variation in sector
composition, have simultaneously increased the productivity (demand) of communicative tasks and attracted
immigrants. To establish causality, we use two sets of instruments that build upon the fact that documented
and undocumented Mexican immigration has represented a large share of the increase in the less-educated
foreign-born population beginning in the 1970s. This aggregate inﬂow was largely independent of state-speciﬁc
demand shocks and can be exploited as an exogenous supply shift if we can diﬀerentiate ﬂo w sa c r o s ss t a t e s .
Our ﬁrst instrument for the share of immigrants among less-educated workers imputes the proportion of
Mexican workers within a state based upon exogenous 1960 demography and subsequent national growth rates.
This methodology relies upon two facts similarly exploited by Card (2001) and several other analyses of immi-
gration’s eﬀect on state or city economies.21 First, new immigrants — especially those with little education —
tend to move to the same areas in which previous immigrants from their source country live.22 Second, unlike
previous waves of immigration, a large proportion of immigrants between 1960 and 2000 came from Mexico.
Together, these facts allow us to use the location preferences of Mexicans as factors aﬀecting the supply of
foreign-born workers across states and time that are uncorrelated with state-speciﬁc demand (productivity).
First, we record the actual share of Mexicans in the employment of state s in 1960 (sh MEXs,1960), and
then assume that the growth rate of the Mexican share of employment between 1960 and year t was equal
across states.23 Thus, Equation (22) imputes shares in year t,w h e r e( 1+g MEX)1960−t is the growth factor
21Also see Cortes (2006), Lewis (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2006), Ottaviano and Peri (2007), and Saiz (2003).
22This is due to information networks between immigrants and their country of origin, as well as to the immigration policy of
the US. A documented less-educated immigrant is most likely to come to the US to join a family member.
23Figures used to impute the Mexican share of employment are not weighted by hours worked.
17of Mexican-born employment nationwide between 1960 and year t,a n d( 1+g US)s,1960−t is the growth factor
of US-born workers in state s between 1960 and year t.T h e i d e n t i ﬁcation power of the instrument is based
on the fact that some states (such as California and Texas) had a larger share of Mexican immigrants in 1960
relative to others. These states will also have larger imputed shares of Mexicans in 1970 through 2000 and, due
to the educational composition of this group, will have a larger immigrant share among less-educated workers.
\ sh MEXs,t = sh MEXs,1960
(1 + g MEX)1960−t
(1 + g US)s,1960−t
(22)
Our second set of instruments similarly relies upon the exogenous increase in Mexican immigration but is
b a s e du p o ng e o g r a p h y .F i r s t ,w eu s et h ef o r m u l af o rg e o d e s i cd i s t a n c et oc a l c u l a t et h ed i s t a n c e( i nt h o u s a n d so f
Kilometers) of each state’s population center of gravity (available from the 2000 Census) to its closest section of
the Mexican border.24 Since we already control for state ﬁxed eﬀects in the regressions, we interact the distance
variable with four year dummies (from 1970 to 2000). This captures the fact that distance from the border had
a larger eﬀect in predicting the inﬂow of less-educated workers in decades with larger Mexican immigration.
Second, we also use a Mexican border dummy interacted with decade indicators to capture the fact that border
states had larger inﬂows of Mexican workers due to undocumented border crossings. Since illegal immigrants are
less mobile across states, border states have experienced a particularly large exogenous supply-driven increase
of less-educated immigrant workers. Altogether, our second set of instruments includes both the distance and
border variables, each interacted with decade indicators.
The ﬁrst three rows of Table 5 report the two stage least squares estimates of γ, γM,a n dγC respectively.
In all cases, we use the average manual and communication O*NET deﬁnitions to construct the task supply
variables, and we weight each state observation by its total employment. Columns (1) and (2) use the imputed
share of Mexicans as instruments. Columns (3) and (4) instrument with the geographic variables. Columns
(5), (6), and (7) use both sets of instruments. Odd number columns use the full sample of states; even number
columns exclude California. In Speciﬁcation (7) we use only men to construct the task supply and foreign-born
share variables.25 The last rows of Table 5 report relevant statistics from the ﬁrst stage regression. First, the F-
test of joint signiﬁcance of the instruments in explaining the endogenous variable (Share foreign Lst) suggests
that each set of instruments has strong explanatory power (F-statistics well above 10). Second, the Hausman
test of over-identifying restrictions (which can be performed when we use more instruments than endogenous
variables) indicates that the exogeneity of instruments can never be rejected at standard levels of signiﬁcance.26
24We divide the US-Mexico border in 12 sections and calculate the distance of each center of gravity with each section and then
choose the shortest distance for each state.
25Table 8 provides a more systematic analysis of the diﬀerent response between men and women. The two groups respond to
immigration similarly.
26The value reported in the second to last row is the χ2 test statistic under the null hypothesis that none of the instruments
appear in the second stage regression. The degrees of freedom are given by the diﬀerence between the number of instruments and
endogenous variables. We have one endogenous variable and either eight or nine instruments: four distance-decade interactions,
18The two-stage least squares results in Table 5 strengthen the OLS conclusions of Table 4. The estimates of
γ are always negative and signiﬁcant. They now range between -0.24 and -0.25 for the full sample, and they
are as large as -0.46 in regressions that exclude California. The qualitative results are robust, but we prefer
Speciﬁcation (5) since it includes all states and instruments. According to those estimates, natives respond
to increases in immigration by signiﬁcantly raising their communication task supply by 0.18% for each one
percentage-point increase in the foreign-born share of less-educated workers (this ﬁgure is larger in all other
speciﬁcations). At the same time they decrease the supply of manual tasks by 0.06% for each percentage-point
increase in the foreign-born share. Note that magnitude of the communication task response is bigger than
that of the manual response for all speciﬁcations. The similarity of the coeﬃcients in Tables 4 and 5, and the
fact that the point estimates are larger in instrumental variables regressions, strengthens our conviction that
the immigration shock was largely an exogenous shift in the relative supply of skills at the state level to which
native workers responded.
4.1.3 Robustness Checks: DOT Variables and Controls for Demand Shifts
The O*NET data assumes a constant skill content (equal to its value in 2000) for each occupation over time.
This does not allow for variation in task intensity across decades due to changes within occupations. DOT
data provides a partial remedy. We use the DOT evaluation of occupational task content in 1977 to measure
skills in 1960, 1970, and 1980, and the data collected by the 1991 survey for 1990 and 2000. Hence, changes in
task specialization will reﬂect both changes in occupational choice as well as the change of skill intensity within
occupations across time.
Table 6 reports the estimates of γ, γM,a n dγC when manual and interactive tasks are measured with
the DOT variables. Manual skills are represented by Eye, Hand, and Foot Coordination in the ﬁrst three
columns, and an average of coordination and dexterity skills in the ﬁnal three. Direction, Control, and Planning
serves as a general measure of interactive tasks in lieu of a more speciﬁc measure of communication skills in
all speciﬁcations. We report the weighted least squares estimates (Columns (1) and (4)), the 2SLS estimates
instrumenting with the imputed Mexican workers (Columns (2) and (5)), and the 2SLS estimates using all
available instruments (Columns (3) and (6)). The last three rows report the F-test of joint signiﬁcance of
the instruments, the Hausman test of over-identifying restrictions (for regressions using more instruments than
endogenous variables), and the p-value from the Hausman test.
The estimates of γ in Table 6 strongly conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings. The causal eﬀect of an increase in the
share of less educated foreign-born workers on the relative manual versus interactive specialization of natives is
four border-decade interactions, and the imputed share of Mexican workers. The last row reports the probability of obtaining the
observed value of the test statistic or higher under the null. We cannot reject the null at any level of signiﬁcance, so the assumption
of instrument exogeneity stands. See Wooldridge (2002).
19roughly -0.23% (using all instruments). The WLS and the 2SLS estimates are not meaningfully diﬀerent from
each other, the 2SLS estimates are not much diﬀerent from those of Table 5 column (5), and the decrease in the
relative supply largely arises from an increase in interactive skills (always signiﬁcantly larger than zero) rather
than a decrease in manual ones (often small or non signiﬁcant).
Our period of analysis is associated with large changes in production technologies, particularly in the diﬀusion
of information technologies and computer adoption. Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) demonstrate that this
change had a large eﬀect in shifting demand from routine to non-routine tasks. Similarly, the increasing
importance of advanced services, the demise of manufacturing, and other sector-shifts might have contributed
substantially to diﬀerences across states in the demand for manual and interactive tasks. In Table 7 we explicitly
introduce controls for a state’s technology level and sector composition that may have confounded the correlation
between immigration and task intensity in our prior analysis.
We begin by including the share of workers (with at most a high school degree) who use a computer at work
to control for the diﬀusion of technology across states. This data is available in the CPS Merged Outgoing
Rotation Group Surveys in 1984, 1997 and 2001. We match the 1984 computer data to the 1980 Census data,
the 1997 computer-use data to the 1990 Census, and the 2001 computer data to the 2000 CPS. We impute a
share of zero for all states in 1970 and 1960 since the personal computer was ﬁrst introduced in 1981.
Our second control accounts more explicitly for the industrial composition of each state in 1960 and its eﬀect





, by assuming that the occupational composition of industries and industry-
speciﬁc employment shocks are uniform across states. First, we calculate the average physical and interactive




i,t. Next, we calculate industry-level national employment growth since 1960, gi,t. By assuming that
industries grew at their national growth rates regardless of the state in which they are located, we can predict
the employment share of industries within each state and year, \ EmpSharei,s,t. Finally, we calculate a state’s
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To control for technology and sector-driven changes in task intensity, Regressions (1) and (4) in Table 7




s,t , and Columns (3) and (6) include both. The
ﬁrst three columns use the O*NET measures of skills, while the ﬁnal three use the DOT data. The ﬁrst row
20reports the estimate of γ. Our control variables usually have a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient with the expected sign —
computer adoption is associated with lower manual versus interactive task supply among natives, while sector-
driven demand shifts are associated with higher values. Importantly, the inclusion of these variables causes the
estimates of γ to range between −0.23 and −0.44. Especially when we include both controls, the native task
specialization response to immigration seems even stronger than our prior estimates (between -0.37 and -0.41%
for an increase of 1% in the share of foreign-born labor). The larger standard errors, however, do not allow us
to reject (in most cases) our previous values.
The last two rows of Table 7 decompose the impact of immigration between its eﬀect on the supply of
manual and interactive tasks. In most cases the positive impact on the supply of interactive skills (between
0.17 and 0.25) is larger and more signiﬁcant than the negative eﬀect on physical ones (between -0.07 and -0.20).
All together, the results of this section continue to provide evidence for increasing task-specialization. The
relative supply of manual versus interactive skills among natives reduce by roughly 0.20% to 0.25% for each one
percentage point increase in the foreign-born share of less-educated workers.
4.1.4 Response of Speciﬁc Groups of Native-Born Workers
The results in Tables 4-7 assumed homogeneity among US-born workers with a high school education or less.
Our approach, however, allows us to identify the eﬀect of immigration on the task specialization of speciﬁc
demographic groups. If γ varies across these groups, then the wage implications of immigration will vary as
well. Table 8 compares estimates of γ, γC,a n dγM for groups bifurcated by race (Column (1)), gender (2), age
(3), and education level (4). For each comparison, “Group 1” represents the group earning lower wages (blacks,
women, younger workers, and workers without high school experience). Except for women, individuals in Group
1 were also more specialized in manual than communication tasks and hence more vulnerable to job competition
with immigrants. The ﬁrst two rows report the weighted least squares estimates of γ for the comparison groups,
and the remaining rows report the 2SLS results (using all instruments) for γ, γC,a n dγM.
Each of the eight native-born groups in Table 8 responds to immigration by shifting their specialization
from manual tasks to communication ones. In most cases, the increase in supply of language skills was more
signiﬁcant and larger than the decrease in supply of physical tasks. Interestingly, both men and women reduce
their relative skill supply by 0.26% for every percentage point increase in the foreign-born share. Diﬀerences
between people with only primary school education and those with high school experience are similarly negligible
— both groups exhibit γ values near -0.35. For other comparison groups, diﬀerences in the γ estimates are quite
large. Younger workers (γ = −0.39) adjusted their task supply in response to immigration much more than
older workers (γ = −0.15) did. This likely arises due to greater occupational mobility earlier in a person’s
career, making older workers in manual occupations more vulnerable to competition from immigrants.
21More strikingly, black workers respond to immigration by changing their relative task specialization three
times more than non-black workers do (γ = −0.77 versus γ = −0.25). Blacks were much more specialized in
manual tasks in comparison to non-blacks in 1960 and were more susceptible to competition from immigrants.
Figure 5 illustrates, however, that less-educated blacks and immigrants have exhibited opposite trends in their
relative supply of manual versus communication tasks over time. Foreign-born and native non-black workers
supplied approximately the same level of relative skills in 1960, but this was much lower than the amount
supplied by native blacks. By 2000, the roles of blacks and immigrants were inverted, and foreign-born workers
were providing far more manual versus communication tasks than either native blacks or non-blacks did. The
strong response among blacks in moving toward more language-intensive occupations should, at least in part,
have shielded them from large negative wage eﬀects.
4.1.5 Native Employment Response
Our analysis ﬁnds that the relative supply of manual versus communication tasks among natives decreases in
response to increased immigration. We believe that this is likely due to a form of occupational upgrading. One
potential alternative, however, is that immigration has simply displaced native workers in physically intensive
jobs, leaving only those in language intensive ones. That is, immigrants may have had a negative employment
eﬀect on native workers.
Most regional analyses ﬁnd that immigration generates little to no native employment eﬀect. In a recent
note (Peri and Sparber (2008)), we argue that to obtain an unbiased estimate of the potential displacement













This model regresses the change in (inter-Census) native employment (∆LD) on the change in foreign-born
employment (∆LF). Eﬀective instruments should avoid “booming region” eﬀects (which would induce positive
correlation due to unobserved positive regional shocks). The parameter η then identiﬁes the eﬀect of immigration
on native employment. A signiﬁcantly negative value implies displacement. Using our 1960-2000 state data we
estimate a positive value of η equal to 0.47 (standard error of 0.39) using OLS, and a positive value of 0.40
(with a standard error of 0.50) using 2SLS and all the instruments from Section 4.1.2.
Several previous studies that use speciﬁcations akin to (25) also tend to ﬁnd zero or small positive eﬀects.
Cortes (2006) uses a variant of (25) in levels to analyze the link between immigration and employment of less-
educated workers across 25 US metropolitan areas between 1980 and 2000. She ﬁnds a positive OLS estimate
around 0.20 and an IV value near 0.05. Card (2001), who uses population growth in a city-skill group cell as the
22dependent variable and the inﬂow rate of immigrants in the same cell as the explanatory variable,27 always ﬁnds
positive and sometimes signiﬁcant eﬀects on the native population (around 0.10). His subsequent IV estimates
(using the shift-share instrument to impute the number of immigrants in a cell) often ﬁnd results similar to
those of his OLS regressions. Ottaviano and Peri (2007) aggregate individuals from all skill levels within a state
and estimate an impact of immigration on native employment between -0.3 and 0.3 that is never signiﬁcant
(standard errors around 0.3). Card and Lewis (2007) estimate the eﬀect of low skilled Mexican immigrants on
native employment. Their Table 6 results ﬁnd an eﬀect between 0 and 0.5 that is rarely signiﬁcant. Card’s
(2007) Speciﬁcation (2) adopts the total (immigrant and native) change in the less educated population (or
employment) as the dependent variable. His estimated coeﬃcient implies a value of slightly η larger than zero.
While many analyses do not ﬁnd evidence for a displacement eﬀect among the native-born labor force, it is
important to study the potential eﬀect for sub-groups as well. Displacement among black workers has been a
particular concern. Our 2SLS regression (similar to (25)) of the change in black employment on the change in
the share of less-educated immigrants ﬁnds a coeﬃcient of -0.01 and standard error of 0.04, thus arguing against
a displacement eﬀect among blacks. Another possibility hypothesized by Borjas et. al. (2006), however, is that
increased labor market competition has pushed native blacks into illegal activity, crime, and jail. In other words,
institutionalization has operated as unemployment in disguise for the black community. This may have selected
among the remaining workers only those who could change occupations toward more language-intensive jobs,
leaving the others with grim prospects. While we do not explore this channel in detail, we do use the number of
blacks living in group quarters (as percentage of less educated workers) as a measure of black institutionalization
across states and Census years. Regressing the decadal change of that variable on the change in the share of
less educated immigrants (including time ﬁxed eﬀects and using 2SLS) we again ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
In sum, previous analyses of immigration have uncovered a puzzling result — immigration simultaneously
generates only small wage eﬀects and no employment eﬀects for natives. We believe our article provides an
explanation. Native workers adjust through occupation upgrading and task specialization. While the impact of
immigration on sub-groups of American workers (and blacks in particular) deserves more research and speciﬁc
attention, our model and estimates provide a mechanism through which groups might decrease their vulnerability
to immigration.
4.2 Immigration and Total Task Supply
The regression speciﬁcation in (26) provides a test of Proposition 3, which states that the total relative supply
of manual versus communication tasks is bigger in economies with a higher share of immigrants. That is, the
large relative task supply among immigrants more than compensates for the reduced supply among natives.
















st by aggregating the supply of physical and language skills from all less-educated workers in
state s and year t. Proposition 3 implies that γ
TOT > 0. However, we can also test how immigration aﬀects the




tasks supplied in equilibrium by running two separate




st as dependent variables. Analogous to the speciﬁcations in (20) and (21),
we call these coeﬃcients γM
TOT and γC
TOT.
The ﬁrst three rows of Table 9 show the parameter estimates of γ
TOT, γM
TOT,a n dγC
TOT.T h el a s tt h r e er o w s
show the F-test of signiﬁc a n c ef o rt h ei n s t r u m e n t si nt h eﬁrst stage and the test of over-identifying restrictions.
Manual and communication tasks are measured using varied sets of O*NET variables (see column headers)
in Columns (1) through (6), while (7) and (8) use DOT data. Each OLS (odd columns) and 2SLS (even
columns) regression exhibits positive and signiﬁcant estimates of γ
TOT, thus robustly conﬁrming the prediction
of Proposition 3. Its value is between 0.35 and 0.4 when using O*NET variables, and is near 0.3 when using
DOT deﬁnitions. These positive values arise due to an increase in the average supply of manual tasks (γM
TOT
between 0.10 and 0.28) and a decline in communication task supply (γC
TOT between −0.24 and 0). States with
large inﬂows of less-educated immigrants experience signiﬁcant increases in physical production skills (brought
mainly by immigrants) relative to language skills, as predicted by theory.
4.3 Immigration and the Rate of Return to Task Performance
Proposition 4 suggests that by altering the relative supply of skills in a state, immigration decreases the rate of
return to manual skills relative to communication ones. In this section, we estimate the relative compensation
response to a state’s changing task composition. The demand function in Equation (3) for state s during year

































We allow relative productivity (βL) to vary systematically across states (due to diﬀerences in industrial
composition) and over time (due to technological change). We also permit a random, zero-mean, idiosyncratic
component in relative productivity. Exogenous shifts in the overall relative supply of physical versus language
skills across states can identify the coeﬃcient 1
θL,w h e r eθL represents the elasticity of substitution between
the tasks. Hence we estimate Equation (28) using two stage least squares. Exogenous shifts in the share of
foreign-born workers will aﬀect the aggregate relative supply of skills. Hence, we can estimate 1
θL by employing





















We cannot directly observe the relative returns to skills, wM
wC . However, IPUMS contains individual-level
data on wages and other characteristics that we can merge with occupational task information. Measurement
of wM and wC for each state and year requires two steps for each year in our sample. First, we select only
workers with at most a high school degree and regress, by year, the logarithm of individual real weekly wages28
on indicator variables for years of experience (40 indicators from 1 to 40), a gender dummy, and a race dummy
(white versus non-white).29 The residuals of these regressions represent individual wages after controlling for
personal characteristics, which we label ln(wage clean)ist for individual i residing in state s in Census year t.
In the second step, we transform the wages into levels and regress them on the occupation-speciﬁcm e a s u r e s
of manual and communication skills using weighted least squares. We do this using a variety of deﬁnitions for
the skill variables. We then allow the coeﬃcients on the skill variables to vary across the 51 states so that
they capture the price of manual and communication tasks in each state. By separately estimating the second
stage regression in Equation (29) for each year, we can identify the state and year-speciﬁc wages received for
supplying manual (wM)st and communication (wC)st tasks.
wage cleanist =( wM)st ∗ Manualist +( wC)ist ∗ Communicationist + εist (29)
N e x t ,w es u b s t i t u t et h ee s t i m a t e sd wMst and c wCst into Equation (28) to estimate 1
θL. Table 10 reports
the values of 1
θL found using diﬀerent O*NET task variable deﬁnitions. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report
the estimates of 1





st. The instrument is relatively powerful (F-statistic of 20), and we obtain estimates
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level between 1.64 and 1.71. To address concerns that Share foreign Lst
could be endogenous as well, we also instrument with our geographic variables and the imputed share of





st. The point estimates of 1
θL range between 0.96 and 1.55, are consistently around one, and are always
very signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Altogether, the 2SLS estimates imply that the share of foreign-born workers reduces the relative compen-
sation paid to manual versus communication tasks, thus conﬁrming Proposition 4. The estimates in Table 10
suggest the elasticity of substitution (θL) ranges between 0.58 and 1.04. Even assuming a value of 1 — at the
28Real weekly wages are calculated by dividing the yearly salary income by the number of weeks worked in the year. The
nominal ﬁgures are converted into real ﬁgures using the CPI-U deﬂa t o rp u b l i s h e db yt h eB u r e a uo fL a bor Statistics and available
at www.bls.gov/cpi.
29We also weight each individual by its Census sample weight times hours worked.
25high end of our estimated range — manual and communication tasks have a high degree of complementarity.
These ﬁgures are comparable to commonly estimated values for the elasticity of substitution between labor and
capital (usually near 1), or between workers of diﬀerent education levels (σ, which fall between 1.5 and 2).30
5S i m u l a t e d E ﬀects of Immigration on Real Wages, 1990-2000
Our empirical analysis suggests that to understand the wage implications of immigration, simulations must
account for the adjustment in native-born task supply. We do so by combining the formulas derived in Section
2 with the estimated response of μD and ζD to immigration from Section 4.1.1 and the elasticity of substitution
between tasks (θL) from Section 4.3. First, we use Equations (15), (35), and (36) and the changes in H, M,
and C due to immigration between 1990 and 2000 to evaluate the eﬀects of immigration on compensation paid
to highly-educated workers, manual tasks, and communication skills. Then we combine those results and the
estimates of ∆μD and ∆ζD in Equation (18) to ﬁnd the overall eﬀect of immigration on average wages paid
to less-educated natives. In Section 5.1 we use the average task supply (μD and ζD) and estimated response
(∆μD and ∆ζD) of all less educated natives by state and decade to obtain an average eﬀect. In Section 5.2 we
use the supply and estimated response of particular demographic groups previously analyzed in Table 8.
5.1 Eﬀect on the Average Less-Educated US-Born Worker
The simulated eﬀect of immigration on average wages paid to less-educated native workers in our model diﬀers
from the eﬀect in a model of perfectly substitutable native and immigrant labor for two reasons. First, the change





is weighted more heavily, and the change in compensation





less heavily, for natives than for the average population (which includes foreign-
born workers). Since immigrants supply more manual tasks, we know that ∆M
M > ∆C
C . This implies ∆wM
wM
(which is usually negative) is smaller than ∆wC
wC (which is sometimes positive). Hence, the loss in compensation
from manual tasks is weighted less in occupations chosen by natives. This attenuation grows larger if natives
increasingly specialize in language skills, and is stronger in high immigration states. Second, the empirical results





W D in Equation (18) also positively contributes to the average wage
of natives. On one hand, immigration increases ζD more signiﬁcantly than it reduces μD.M o r e o v e r , t h e











in 1990 and 2000.31 This diﬀerential was larger in high immigration states so
that immigration shifted workers to occupations whose tasks were better compensated. On the other hand, the
30See Katz and Murphy (1992) or Angrist (1995).
31The estimates of g wM and g wC were obtained in Section 4.3 and are used in this section to calculate the shares of M and C in







26estimates from Tables 5, 6, and 7 imply that the positive impact of immigration on ∆ζD was generally larger
than the negative impact on ∆μD. Hence, higher demand for complementary services also had a positive eﬀect
on average wages, shifting natives to jobs with higher communication content.
Table 11 reports the simulated eﬀects of immigration from 1990-2000 at the national level and for the ten
states with the highest share of immigrants among their less-educated workforce in 2000 (listed alphabetically).
The ﬁrst two columns report the increase in foreign-born employment (as a percentage of 1990 total group









respectively. Notice that for each reported state (except New Jersey and Florida) the percentage inﬂow of
less-educated immigrants during 1990-2000 was larger than the inﬂow of more-educated ones. For Arizona and
Texas the inﬂow of less-educated was more than three times that of more-educated workers.
Columns (3) through (5) apply the formulas (15), (35), and (36) to obtain the percentage change in wages
















immigration.32 Since the inﬂow of highly-educated immigrants was small relative to the inﬂow of less-educated
ones, the wage eﬀect on people with college education is usually positive (a gain of 1.2% at the national level).
The change in returns to manual versus communication tasks caused by immigration is clearly more important
for understanding the eﬀects of immigration on less-educated workers. In California, the compensation paid
for physical skills performed by less educated workers decreased by 8.4%, while the compensation of language
skills increased by 0.3%. In Arizona, the return to manual tasks decreased by 14%, while the wage paid for
communication tasks decreased by only 1%. Nationally, the return to manual tasks decreased by 2.8%, while
the return to communication tasks increased 1.2%.
The ﬁnal three columns of Table 11 highlight the ultimate wage consequences of immigration for less-educated
native-born workers. Column (6) reports the eﬀect on average wages before accounting for any shift in domestic
task supply or for diﬀerences in the relative supply of tasks. That is, these ﬁgures are useful for identifying
the counter-factual wage eﬀects identiﬁed by models that assume perfect substitutability between native and
foreign-born workers of similar educational attainment. Column (8), by comparison, reports the wage eﬀects
for less-educated natives that account for the reallocation of tasks following immigration. Column (7) provides
the diﬀerence between these values. Thus, this column illustrates the diﬀerence in wage eﬀects estimated in
our model of comparative advantage versus a traditional one of homogeneous labor. To calculate these ﬁgures,
we use the formula in (18). We then compute the values of ∆ζD and ∆μD by multiplying the change in the
foreign-born share of each state between 1990 and 2000 by the average response of communication and manual
task supply to immigration from Column (5) of Table 5 (respectively +0.18 and -0.06). The resulting values
are elasticities that, when multiplied by the initial values of task supply, equal ∆ζD and ∆μD.
32We assume a value of σ =1 .75 that is in the middle of the range usually estimated in the literature (1.5 to 2). We also set
θL = 1, a value implying that tasks are more substitutable than most of our estimates ﬁnd.
27By specializing in language skill-intense occupations, less-educated natives reduce wage losses due to immi-
gration. At the national level, specialization causes the wage loss of less-educated native workers to decline by
one percentage point (from -1.2% to -0.2%). In states with large immigration (such as California, Arizona, and
Nevada) task reallocation reduces the wage loss by around 2.5 percentage points. Specialization changes the
eﬀect of immigration on less-educated natives from negative to positive values in three states.
State-level averages still conceal a large degree of variation in wage eﬀects across occupations. Columns (3)
and (4) illustrate that immigration is more likely to harm workers who did not move from physical to language—
intensive jobs. For instance, less-educated Texas workers in occupations with only manual content would have
lost 8.8% of their wage, while workers in jobs only demanding language skills would have gained 2.1%. This
shows that less-educated natives protected themselves from most of the negative wage eﬀects of immigration
ﬁrst because they have typically chosen jobs with higher communication requirements than manual content,
and second because immigration pushed them to seek such occupations at higher rates.
5.2 Eﬀect on Native Sub-Groups
Table 12 reports the simulated eﬀects of immigration on the four “Group 1” sub-groups of native less-educated
workers from Section 4.1.4 that earn especially low average wages (blacks, women, young workers, and workers
with only primary school education). The simulations are somewhat simplistic — they assume that groups only
diﬀer in their relative supply of manual versus communication tasks and in their supply response to immigration.
The estimated changes in task supply (∆ζ and ∆μ) are obtained using the respective 2SLS estimates in Table
8. Intuitively, those groups for which the response to immigration was stronger are those that protected their
wages more from competition with immigrants.
Black workers exhibited the greatest skill response and protected their wages most eﬀectively. Though still
losing 2.9% of their real wages in Arizona, the simulated eﬀect for black workers gives them a positive wage
eﬀect in seven of the ten states considered and a gain of 0.9% at the national level. While black workers might
have been more exposed to competition with immigrants simply because the percentage of blacks among less-
educated workers is large, and in some states the negative wage eﬀect was non-trivial, we ﬁnd that they switched
their task supply in greater magnitude because they were more threatened by competition with immigrants.
Skill upgrading and wage protection also occurred among young workers and those with only primary
education. Workers under 40 years old experienced no wage impact nationally and the wage eﬀects are between
0.5 and 0.9 percentage points less negative in each state than for the average less-educated native worker.33
Workers with eight years or less education gained in six of the ten states with a positive 0.3% gain nationally.
Women, on the other hand, experienced negative consequences more than other low wage earning groups did
33Note that part of the response among blacks may be due to their comparatively low average age.
28because their task supply was relatively static. The female task response and wage impact is very close to the
average eﬀect among all native-born less-educated workers.
6 Conclusions
The eﬀects of immigration on wages paid to native-born workers with low levels of educational attainment
depend upon two critical factors. The ﬁrst is whether immigrants take jobs similar to those of native workers or
instead take diﬀering jobs due to inherent comparative advantages between native and foreign-born employees
in performing particular productive tasks. The second is whether US-born workers respond to immigration and
adjust their occupation choices to shield themselves from competition with immigrant labor.
This paper provides a simple and new theoretical framework and empirical evidence to analyze these issues.
We argue that production combines diﬀerent labor skills. Immigrants with little educational attainment have
a comparative advantage in manual and physical tasks, while natives of similar levels of education have a com-
parative advantage in communication and language-intensive tasks. Native and foreign-born workers specialize
accordingly. When immigration generates large increases in manual task supply, the relative compensation paid
to communication skills rises, thereby rewarding natives who progressively move to language-intensive jobs.
Our empirical analysis used O*NET data and DOT information to measure the task-content of occupations
in the United States between 1960 and 2000. We ﬁnd strong evidence supporting the implications of our
theoretical model. On average, less-educated immigrants supplied more manual relative to communication
tasks than natives supplied. In states with large immigration among the less-educated labor force, native
workers shifted to occupations intensive in language skills, thereby reducing native workers’ relative supply of
manual versus communication tasks. There is a larger relative supply of manual versus communication tasks in
states with high levels of immigration. This implies that immigrants more than compensate for the change in
skill supply among natives, and it ensures that manual task-intensive occupations earn lower wages.
Since native-born workers respond to inﬂows of immigrant labor by specializing in occupations demanding
language skills, the relative supply of communication tasks by the average US-born worker has increased signiﬁ-
cantly in the recent decades. As a consequence, the wage loss of less-educated native workers in states with large
immigration was signiﬁcantly smaller than predicted by models in which the labor supplied by less-educated
natives and immigrants is perfectly substitutable. In particular, we estimate that immigration of less-educated
workers only reduced average real wages paid to less-educated US-born workers by 0.2% between 1990 and 2000.
Without task specialization, that loss would have equaled 1.2%.
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32A Appendix — Derivation of Equations from Section 2
A.1 Equations from Section 2.1
Competitive labor markets and producers of YL and YH generate equilibrium conditions for relative input prices
and task compensation. By equating the marginal productivity of intermediate goods to their prices, we ﬁnd
the relationship between the relative price of intermediate goods and their relative demand in Equation (30).












A.2 Equations from Section 2.2
Maximization of WL,j with respect to lj in Equation (4) generates the optimal relative allocation of labor for
worker j in Equation (31). By rearranging the deﬁnitions of unit-task supply and substituting them into this










A.3 Details and Proof of Qualitative Implications
In Section 2.3 we obtained the equilibrium relative compensation of tasks (12) by substituting (6) for do-
mestic and foreign workers into (11), and then equating it with the demand curve (3). Intuitively, this is
















The four qualitative implications of the model are listed below with their respective proofs.
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Proof: Consider individual supply (10) for the average immigrant and domestic worker. The two expressions


























. Multiplying the numerator and the denominator of the ﬁrst ratio
by LF, and the numerator and the denominator of the second ratio by LD we obtain MF
CF > MD
CD . QED.
2. A higher foreign-born share (s) of less-educated workers in an economy induces lower aggregate supply of






























is monotonically increasing in f.S i n c ef depends positively on s (speciﬁcally, ∂f/∂s =
ζFζD
(sζF+(1−s)ζD)2 > 0), the









D is a negative function of s. QED.
3. A higher foreign-born share (s) of less-educated workers in an economy induces a larger supply of manual
relative to communication tasks among less-educated workers overall, M∗
C∗ .















in Equation (14) is monotonically increases in s






C∗ depends positively on s. QED.
4. A higher foreign-born share (s) of less-educated workers in an economy induces lower compensation paid




















in Equation (12) contains is monotonically increases


















To isolate the eﬀect of immigration on wages, ﬁrst substitute (2) into the production function (1) and take the





























Highly-educated workers earn the unit price of the intermediate good they produce. The logarithmic diﬀer-
ential of (34) directly measures immigration’s eﬀect on highly-educated workers as expressed in (15).
Wages paid to less-educated workers are divided into their task components. The ﬁrst order eﬀect of





































































Using Equations (35) and (36) we can express the wage eﬀect for less-educated workers at constant special-
ization by substituting for ∆wM
wM and ∆wC




















Note that (37) represents the average manual and communication wage eﬀects weighted by their respective
initial supplies. The total eﬀect of immigration on the average native-born less-educated worker that accounts
for (16) as well as for the eﬀect of changing specialization is given by Equation (18) in the main text.
To derive ∆YL
YL , ﬁr s tn o t et h a ts i n c eYL is produced under perfect competition using services of less-educated
workers, we know the total income generated in sector YL will be distributed to less-educated workers as in
Equation (38).
PLYL = WLL = wMM + wCC (38)
This allows us to relate changes in the production of YL to small changes of inputs M and C as in Equation
(17). The formal proof hinges only on constant returns to scale to M and C in (2). First, re-write Equation


























dC . Distributing the diﬀerentiation with
















































YL equals one (Euler
Condition). Constant returns also imply that the second derivatives (with respect to M or C), multiplied by
the shares M
YL and C














Finally, we label the term wMM
PLYL = wMM
WLL as κM,a n d wCC
PLYL = wCC
WLL as (1−κM). We then use ∆,r a t h e rt h a n
d, to indicate a small (rather than an inﬁnitesimal) changes to obtain equation (17).














Skill (or Task) Types, Sub-Types, and Variables from O*NET and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) 
 
Type of Skill  Skill Sub-Type  O*NET Variables DOT Variables 
Finger Dexterity  Finger Dexterity 
Arm-Hand Steadiness    
Manual Dexterity    
Dexterity 
Wrist-Finger Speed    
Multi-Limb Coordination  Eye, Hand, and Foot Coordination 
Coordination 
Gross Body Coordination    




Dynamic Strength    
Oral Comprehension    
Oral 
Oral Expression    
Written Comprehension    
Communication 
(or Language) 
Skills  Written 










Note:  O*NET variables come from the O*NET abilities survey. DOT variables come from Autor, Levy, and 
Murnane (2003).     37
Table 2 











Management Analysts  0.12  0.93  0.13  0.00 
Financial Services Sales Occupations  0.24  0.75  0.32  0.10 
Secretaries 0.33  0.82  0.40  0.20 
Transportation Ticket and Reservation Agents  0.35  0.69  0.51  0.30 
Primary School Teachers  0.49  0.70  0.70  0.40 
Production Supervisors or Foremen  0.58  0.65  0.91  0.50 
Nursing Aides, Orderlies, & Attendants  0.69  0.55  1.26  0.60 
Cashiers 0.74  0.38  1.91  0.70 
Truck, Delivery, & Tractor Drivers  0.85  0.29  2.95  0.80 
Assemblers of Electrical Equipment  0.70  0.11  6.18  0.90 
Drywall Installers  0.67  0.00  268.27  1.00 
 
 
Note:  Authors’ calculations are based upon O*NET task definitions and the 2000 Census. The occupations included are those at 
each decile of the 2000 distribution or workers’ manual versus communication task intensity. The manual index is constructed 
averaging eight measures that capture the intensity of use of several physical abilities. The communication task index is constructed 
averaging four measures that capture oral and written expression and comprehension. Both are standardized to be between 0 and 1. 
The details of their construction are reported in the main text.   38
Table 3 
Occupations, Relative Task Intensity, and the Foreign-Born Share of Less-Educated Employment 
                
      
Foreign Born Share of Less-
Educated Employment 





Communication 1970 1980 1990 2000 Increase 
1970-2000
Four Occupations with Lowest Manual/Communication Values 
              
Managers of Properties and Real Estate  0.14  0.74  0.19  14% 11% 12% 14% 0% 
Insurance  Sales  Occupations  0.21  0.81  0.26  4% 3% 4% 6%  2% 
Real Estate Sales Occupations  0.24  0.76  0.32  5%  7%  9%  13% 8% 
Salespersons,  n.e.c.  0.27  0.70  0.38  4% 6% 8%  10% 6% 
Four Occupations with Highest Manual/Communication Values 
              
Gardeners and Groundskeepers  0.82  0.07  11.7  9%  13% 27% 39% 30% 
Laborers Outside Construction  0.72  0.05  14.9  6%  9%  15% 16% 10% 
Vehicle Washers and Equipment Cleaners  0.72  0.04  19.1  7%  9%  18% 27% 20% 
Roofers and Slaters  0.73  0.01  146.7  4%  8%  14% 30% 27% 
  
Note:  Authors’ calculations based upon O*NET task definitions and Census 1970-2000. The occupations included are those with more than 
25,000 less-educated employees in each year. Only less-educated wage-earning employees aged between 18 to 65 years old and not living in 
group quarters are considered. The manual index is constructed averaging eight measures that capture the intensity of several physical abilities. 
The communication task index is constructed averaging four measures that capture oral and written expression and comprehension. Both are 
standardized to be between 0 and 1. The details of their construction are reported in the main text.   39
 
 
Table 4  
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Native Supply of Tasks, Least Squares Estimates  
Workers with a High School Degree or Less, Different Definitions of Manual and Communication Skills Using O*NET Data 
 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Workers with a High School Degree or Less 
  

























































Ln( D μ ),  
Manual 
γ
















Ln( D ζ ),  
Communication 
γ

















  255  250 255 250  255  250 255 250 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from a separate regression. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The explanatory variable is the 
foreign-born share of less-educated labor.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 
1960-2000). All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is least squares. Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for 
each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state.  
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Table 5  
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Native Supply of Tasks, 2SLS Estimates  
Workers with a High School Degree or Less 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Workers with a High School Degree or Less   
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Test of Over-Identifying 
Restrictions 
(Specification in First Row) 
N.A. N.A.  8.92 7.65 9.18 10  10.2 
Probability (χ
2 > test)  
under the Null of Exogeneity 
of Instruments  
N.A. N.A.  27% 37% 23%  27%  26% 
Number  of  Observations  255 204 255 204 255  204  204 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The explanatory variable is the 
foreign-born share of less-educated labor.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 
1960-2000). All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Specifications (1)-(2) instrument using the 
imputed share of Mexicans constructed as described in the main text. Specifications (3)-(4) instrument using the distance between the center of gravity of the 
state and the Mexican border and a dummy equal to one for states on the Mexican border, all interacted with four decade dummies.  Specifications (5) and (6) use 
all instrumental variables together. Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust 
and clustered by state.  
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
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Table 6  
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Native Supply of Tasks, Measured by DOT Variables 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. Interactive skills are used in lieu of 
communication data, which DOT data does not provide. The explanatory variable is the foreign-born share of less-educated labor measured as hours worked.  The units of 
observation in each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000). All regressions include state and year fixed effects. 
Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. The last two rows 
report the Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions that can be performed when we use more instruments than endogenous variables. We report the test statistic and the 
p-value, namely the probability that χ
2 is larger than the observed statistic under the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the instruments.  
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Less-Educated Workers 
Description of DOT Skill Measures:  Manual: Coordination Skills 
Interactive: Direction, Control, and Planning 
Manual: Coordination and Dexterity Skills 
Interactive: Direction, Control, and Planning 
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Joint F-Test of the 
Instruments (p-value) 








Test of Over-Identifying 
Restrictions 
(Specification in First Row) 
  NA NA 7.65  NA NA  7.65 
Probability (χ
2 > test)  
under the Null of 
Exogeneity of Instruments  
  NA NA  43%  NA NA  43% 
Number  of  Observations    255 255 255  255 255 255   42
Table 7 
Controlling for Technology and Demand Factors  
 
Dependent Variable: Relative Task Supply among Domestic Workers, Ln (ManualD /CommunicationD ) 
  O*NET Measures  DOT Measures 
  Manual: All Manual Skills 
Communication: All Communication Skills 
Manual: Eye, Hand, and Foot Coordination 









All Instruments  
(3)  
2SLS 









All Instruments  



































Decomposition of the Effect between Manual and Communication Tasks 
Effect of Foreign-Born Share 













Effect of Foreign-Born Share 













Number of Observations  255  255  255  255  255  255 
 
Note:  The top three rows report estimates of the impact of the foreign-born share, percentage of computer users, and industry-driven change in relative task 
intensity on the relative task supply of natives. The bottom two rows report the effect of immigration on the supply of manual and communication tasks 
separately.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 
observations. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Regressions use employment as an analytic 
weight for each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. 
** indicates significance at the 5% level   43
Table 8 
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Supply of Tasks among Different Demographic Groups of US-Born Workers  
with a High School Degree or Less Education 
 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. Working individuals with a high school degree or less are included. The dependent 
variable is calculated for specific demographic groups. In each comparison, Group 1 earns lower wages than Group 2 does. The units of observation in 
each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. All regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is OLS in the first two rows and two stage least squares using all instruments in the 
remaining rows. Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and 
clustered by state. 
** indicates significance at the 5% level 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Workers with a High School Degree or Less Education 
Dependent Variable: 
(Domestic Workers Only) 
Parameter Group  1:  Blacks 
Group2: Non-Blacks 
Group 1: Women 
Group 2: Men 
Group 1: Young (18-40) 
Group 2: Old (41-65) 
Group 1: Primary School Only   










Group 1, Ln(MD/CD)  γ 
      
-0.15* -0.17**  -0.14**  -0.30**  Group 2, Ln(MD/CD)  γ 
(0.07) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
2SLS 
-0.77** -0.26**  -0.39**  -0.34**  Group 1, Ln(MD/CD)  γ 
(0.14) (0.07)  (0.15)  (0.11) 
-0.21** -0.06**  -0.11**  -0.06**  Group 1, Ln(MD)  γM 
(0.04) (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
0.56** 0.19**  0.28**  0.28**  Group 1, Ln(CD)  γC 
(0.09) (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.06) 
-0.25** -0.25**  -0.15**  -0.36**  Group 2, Ln(MD/CD)  γ 
(0.11) (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
-0.07** -0.05**  -0.03  -0.10**  Group 2, Ln(MD)  γM 
(0.02) (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
0.18** 0.20**  0.12**  0.26**  Group 2, Ln(CD)  γC 
(0.09) (0.09)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Number of Observations        255  255  255  255   44
Table 9  
Impact of Foreign-Born Workers on the Total Supply of Tasks 
Note: Each cell contains estimates from separate regressions. The dependent variable in each is indicated in the first column. The explanatory variable is the 
foreign-born share of less-educated labor.  The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC 
from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. All regressions include state and year fixed effects. The method of estimation is OLS or two stage least 
squares using all instruments. Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for each observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust 
and clustered by state. The last two rows report the Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions that can be performed when we use more instruments that 
endogenous variables. We report the test statistic and the p-value, namely the probability that χ
2 is larger than the observed statistic under the null hypothesis of 
the exogeneity of the instruments. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
Explanatory Variable: Foreign-Born Share of Less-Educated Workers 
  O*NET Measures  DOT Measures 




Manual: Dexterity Skills 
Communication: Oral 
Language Skills 
Manual: Strength Skills 
Communication: All 
Communication Skills 
Manual: Eye, Hand, and 
Foot Coordination 
Interactive: Direction, 





















All Workers  
Ln(M/C)  




































All Workers  
 Ln(ζ ) 
γ
C



























Test of Over-Identifying 
Restrictions 
(Specification in First Row) 
NA 6.12  NA 5.86  NA 5.35 NA  4.02 
Probability (χ
2 > test)  
under the Null of Exogeneity 
of Instruments  
NA 64%  NA 67%  NA 72% NA  85% 
Number  of  Observations  255 255  255 255  255 255 255  255   45
 
Table 10 
Estimates of the Relative Wage Elasticity of Manual versus Communication Tasks 
 
Dependent Variable: Wage Paid to Manual Tasks / Wage Paid to Communication Tasks 
 
  Manual: All Manual Skills 
Communication: All 
Communication Skills 
Manual: Dexterity Skills 
Communication: Oral 
Language Skills 




































0.58 0.65 0.56  1.04 0.61 0.66 
F-test of Joint 
Significance of 
the Instruments 
20.8 17.5 20.8  17.5 20.8 17.5 
Observations 255  255  255  255  255  255 
 
 
Note: The explanatory variable is the negative of the logarithm of the relative supply of manual versus communication tasks among all 
workers. In Specifications (1), (3), and (5) we use the foreign-born share of less-educated workers as an instrument for the relative supply 
of manual versus communication tasks in the state. In Specifications (2), (4), and (6), the instrument is the portion of the foreign-born 
share explained by the geographic variables plus the imputed share of Mexicans. The units of observation in each regression are U.S. states 
in a Census year (decennial panel of 50 states plus DC from 1960-2000) for a total of 255 observations. All regressions include state and 
year fixed effects. The method of estimation is two stage least squares. Regressions use employment as an analytic weight for each 
observation, and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state. The supply of manual and communication tasks is 
obtained using the different definitions according to the column headers. 
** indicates significance at the 5% 
   46
Table 11 

















% of Initial 





































Arizona  8% 29%  3.2%  -14.2%  -1.3%  -8.2% 2.8%  -5.4% 
California  12% 24% 1.5%  -8.4%  0.3%  -4.5% 2.5%  -2.0% 
DC  6% 10%  0.5%  -3.3%  -0.4%  -2.0% 2.2% 0.2% 
Florida  14% 14%  -0.1%  -2.3%  2.8%  0.2% 1.3%  1.5% 
Hawaii  7% 8%  0.1%  -3.4%  4.9%  -0.3% 1.0% 0.6% 
Illinois  7% 12%  0.8%  -3.5%  0.7%  -1.8% 1.4%  -0.5% 
Nevada  16% 34% 3.5%  -12.0%  1.4%  -5.8% 2.4%  -3.4% 
New Jersey  13% 10%  -0.6%  -0.4%  3.7%  1.6% 1.4%  3.0% 
New York  10% 13% 0.3%  -2.5%  1.1%  -0.7% 1.8% 1.1% 
Texas  8% 22%  2.1%  -8.8%  0.0%  -4.8% 2.0%  -2.8% 
United States  6% 9%  0.6%  -2.8%  1.2%  -1.2% 1.0%  -0.2% 
 
 
Note: The variables and parameters used in the simulations reported above are described in the text. In particular, we assumed σ=1.75 and θL=1. The ten states chosen are 
those with highest foreign-born employment shares among less-educated workers in 2000. The parameters used to estimate the change in supply of each task among 
native workers in response to immigration are the parameters in Column (5) of Table 5, namely γ
M=0.18 and γ




Foreign-Born Workers and the Simulated Long-Run Effects on Wages and Task Compensation Due to Immigration (1990-2000), 





Change in Wage 
of Less-Educated 
Black Natives  
(2) 
Change in Wage 
of Less-Educated 
Native Women  
(3) 
Change in Wage 
of Less-Educated 
Natives under 40 
Years of Age  
(4) 




Arizona  -2.9% -5.5% -4.6%  -4.0% 
California 1.3%  -2.0%  -1.3%  -0.8% 
DC  4.0% 0.2% 1.1%  1.5% 
Florida  2.6% 1.5% 2.0%  2.2% 
Hawaii  1.9% 0.6% 0.8%  1.1% 
Illinois 1.1%  -0.5%  -0.1%  0.3% 
Nevada  -1.1% -3.5% -2.7%  -2.2% 
New  Jersey  4.7% 2.9% 3.4%  3.8% 
New  York  4.1% 1.0% 1.6%  2.0% 
Texas  -0.8% -2.9% -2.2%  -1.8% 
United States  0.9% -0.3% 0.0%  0.3% 
 
 
Note: The variables and parameters used in the simulations reported above are described in the text. In particular, we assumed σ=1.75 and θL=1. The parameters used to 
estimate the task supply response of each native group to an increase of foreign-born share among less educated are those obtained in Table 8, fourth and fifth row, for 





Relative Manual/Communication Task Supply and Demand 
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Manual/Communication Intensity of Natives and Immigrants, O*NET Measures, 1960-2000 
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Average Manual versus Communication Supply of Black and Non-Black Natives and Immigrants  
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Table 1A 
Relative Manual versus Communication Content of Occupations, O*NET Values 
 
M/C Occupation    M/C Occupation 
0.13  Management analysts    0.42  Accountants & auditors 
0.13  Psychologists    0.42  Actors, directors, producers 
0.16  Subject instructors (HS/college)    0.43  Air traffic controllers 
0.17  Business & promotion agents    0.43  Mtrl record, schedule, product, plan, & expedite clerks 
0.18  Lawyers    0.43  Metallurgical & materials engineers, variously phrased 
0.18  Judges    0.44  Purchasing managers, agents & buyers, n.e.c. 
0.19  Managers of properties & real estate   0.45  Welfare  service  aides 
0.19  Atmospheric & space scientists    0.45  Geologists 
0.20  Medical scientists    0.45  Payroll & timekeeping clerks 
0.20  Dietitians & nutritionists   0.46  Pharmacists 
0.21 Actuaries    0.47 Dispatchers 
0.21  Economists, market researchers, & survey researchers    0.47  Legal assistants, paralegals, legal support, etc 
0.22 Financial  managers    0.47 Computer software developers 
0.22  Operations & systems researchers & analysts    0.49  Physicians 
0.22  Physicists & astronomers    0.50  Correspondence & order clerks 
0.23  Vocational & educational counselors    0.51  Buyers, wholesale & retail trade 
0.23  Management support occupations    0.51  Transportation ticket & reservation agents 
0.24 Aerospace  engineer    0.51 Art/entertainment performers & related 
0.24  Advertising & related sales jobs    0.51  Announcers 
0.25 Proofreaders    0.52 Mechanical  engineers 
0.25 Legislators    0.52 Physicians'  assistants 
0.25  Chief executives & public administrators    0.52  Office supervisors 
0.26  Editors & reporters    0.52  Administrative support jobs, n.e.c. 
0.26  Managers of service organizations, n.e.c.    0.52  Agricultural & food scientists 
0.26  Insurance sales occupations    0.52  Chemists 
0.28  Technical writers    0.53  Statistical clerks 
0.29  Sociologists    0.53  Computer & peripheral equipment operators 
0.29  Social scientists, n.e.c.    0.53  Records clerks 
0.29  Managers of medicine & health occupations    0.54  Bookkeepers & accounting & auditing clerks 
0.29  Social workers    0.55  Inspectors & compliance officers, outside construction 
0.30  Managers in education & related fields    0.55  Petroleum, mining, & geological engineers 
0.30  Insurance adjusters, examiners, & investigators    0.58  Computer systems analysts & computer scientists 
0.30  Mgrs & specialists in marketing, advertising, & PR    0.60  Statisticians 
0.32  Personnel, HR, training, & labor relations specialists    0.60  Mathematicians & mathematical scientists 
0.32  Financial services sales occupations   0.60  Electrical  engineer 
0.32  Other financial specialists    0.62  Librarians 
0.32  Real estate sales occupations    0.62  Purchasing agents & buyers, of farm products 
0.32  Human resources & labor relations managers    0.62  Supervisors of personal service jobs, n.e.c. 
0.33  Writers & authors    0.62  Telephone operators 
0.33  Industrial engineers    0.63  Farm managers, except for horticultural farms 
0.33  Bill & account collectors    0.65  Bank tellers 
0.34  Clergy & religious workers    0.65  Podiatrists 
0.34  Eligibility clerks for gov't programs; social welfare    0.65  Occupational therapists 
0.36  Interviewers, enumerators, & surveyors    0.66  Billing clerks & related financial records processing 
0.36  Urban & regional planners   0.67  Funeral  directors 
0.38  Human resources clerks, except payroll & timekeeping    0.67  Drafters 
0.38  Salespersons, n.e.c.    0.69  Registered nurses 
0.38  Managers & administrators, n.e.c.    0.70  Primary school teachers 
0.39  Special education teachers    0.70  Not-elsewhere-classified engineers 
0.39  Speech therapists    0.71  Civil engineers 
0.39  Hotel clerks    0.72  General office clerks 
0.39  Sales engineers    0.74  Guards, watchmen, doorkeepers 
0.40  Architects    0.74  Health record tech specialists 
0.40 Secretaries    0.75 Teachers  ,  n.e.c. 
0.40 Insurance  underwriters    0.75 Receptionists 
0.40 Postmasters  &  mail  superintendents    0.75 Supervisors of motor vehicle transportation 
0.41  Cust srvc reps, investigators & adjusters, except ins.    0.76  Biological scientists 
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Table 1A  
(Continued) 
 
M/C Occupation    M/C Occupation 
0.77 Licensed  practical  nurses    1.53 Waiter/waitress 
0.79  Secondary school teachers   1.53  Bartenders 
0.81  Data entry keyers    1.54  Weighers, measurers, & checkers 
0.82  Inspectors of agricultural products    1.54  Surveyors, cartographers, mapping scientists & tech 
0.82  Power plant operators    1.59 Recreation  facility  attendants 
0.82  Managers of food-serving & lodging establishments    1.63  Railroad conductors & yardmasters 
0.86  Optometrists    1.66  Taxi cab drivers & chauffeurs 
0.86  Supervisors of mechanics & repairers    1.67  Other health & therapy 
0.89  Therapists, n.e.c.    1.67  Fire fighting, prevention, & inspection 
0.90  Optical goods workers    1.71  Dancers 
0.91  Production supervisors or foremen    1.75  Pest control occupations 
0.91 Typists    1.77 Shipping & receiving clerks 
0.91  Door-to-door sales, street sales, & news vendors    1.78  Retail sales clerks 
0.92  Kindergarten & earlier school teachers   1.84  Art  makers:  paint,  sculpt, craft-art, & print-makers 
0.92  Supervisors & proprietors of sales jobs    1.91  Cashiers 
0.93  Guides    1.91  Motion picture projectionists 
0.94  Library assistants    1.94  Elevator installers & repairers 
0.96  Supervisors of cleaning & building service    2.06  Postal clerks, excluding mail carriers 
0.96  Construction inspectors    2.10  Cooks, variously defined 
0.96 Chemical  technicians    2.13 Crossing guards & bridge tenders 
0.97 Baggage  porters    2.22 Repairers  of industrial electrical equipment 
0.98  Chemical engineers    2.23  Explosives workers 
0.98  Health aides, except nursing    2.27  Forge & hammer operators 
0.99  Supervisors of construction work    2.28  Kitchen workers 
0.99  Foresters & conservation scientists    2.33  Bakers 
1.02 Dental  assistants    2.33 Messengers 
1.02  Personal service occupations, nec    2.35  Electricians 
1.02  Technicians, n.e.c.    2.36  Bus drivers 
1.03  Child care workers    2.40  Animal caretakers except on farms 
1.04 File  clerks    2.41 Athletes,  sports instructors, & officials 
1.04 Veterinarians    2.44 Hairdressers & cosmetologists 
1.06  Police, detectives, & private investigators    2.44  Ushers 
1.08  Musician or composer    2.44  Photographers 
1.09 Respiratory  therapists    2.50  Separating, filtering, & clarifying machine operators 
1.10  Health technologists & technicians, n.e.c.    2.53  Winding & twisting textile/apparel operatives 
1.10  Clinical laboratory technologies & technicians    2.53  Knitters, loopers, & toppers textile operatives 
1.15  Other law enforcement: sheriffs, bailiffs, correctional    2.57  Tool & die makers & die setters 
1.16  Engineering technicians, n.e.c.    2.59  Photographic process workers 
1.17  Physical therapists    2.63  Stock & inventory clerks 
1.17  Designers    2.70  Repairers of electrical equipment, n.e.c. 
1.20  Archivists & curators    2.72  Roasting & baking machine operators (food) 
1.26  Nursing aides, orderlies, & attendants    2.74  Plumbers, pipe fitters, & steamfitters 
1.27  Recreation workers    2.75  Mail clerks, outside of post office 
1.27 Dentists    2.80 Meter  readers 
1.27  Airplane pilots & navigators    2.83  Machine operators, n.e.c. 
1.28  Supervisors of agricultural occupations   2.84  Dental  hygienists 
1.29  Dental laboratory & medical appliance technicians    2.84  Repairers of mechanical controls & valves 
1.29 Biological  technicians    2.87 Automobile  mechanics 
1.32  Other science technicians    2.89  Boilermakers 
1.32  Radiologic tech specialists    2.92  Drilling & boring machine operators 
1.34  Repairers of data processing equipment    2.92  Barbers 
1.35  Water transport infrastructure tenders & cross guards    2.95  Truck, delivery, & tractor drivers 
1.35  Freight, stock, & materials handlers    3.00  Programmers of numerically controlled machine tools 
1.37  Protective services, n.e.c.    3.01  Helpers, constructions 
1.44  Graders & sorters in manufacturing    3.03  Electric power installers & repairers 
1.47  Broadcast equipment operators    3.03 Machinery  maintenance  occupations 
1.52  Public transportation attendants & inspectors    3.05  Timber, logging, & forestry workers 
 
 





M/C Occupation    M/C  Occupation 
3.11  Insulation workers    6.11  Welders & metal cutters 
3.14 Machinists    6.15  Plasterers 
3.25  Mail & paper handlers    6.18  Assemblers of electrical equipment 
3.26  Mail carriers for postal service    6.22  Laundry workers 
3.28  Packers, fillers, & wrappers    6.32  Packers & packagers by hand 
3.31  Sales demonstrators / promoters / models    6.36  Mixing & blending machine operatives 
3.33  Locksmiths & safe repairers    6.40  Production helpers 
3.34  Batch food makers    6.72  Concrete & cement workers 
3.34  Water & sewage treatment plant operators   6.91  Structural  metal  workers 
3.34  Heating, air conditioning, & refrigeration mechanics    7.12  Other woodworking machine operators 
3.35  Telecom & line installers & repairers    7.14  Punching & stamping press operatives 
3.44  Materials movers: stevedores & long shore workers    7.17  Aircraft mechanics 
3.45  Bus, truck, & stationary engine mechanics    7.34  Mechanics & repairers, n.e.c. 
3.45  Other plant & system operators    7.34  Housekeep, maids, butlers, & lodging quarters cleaners 
3.49  Locomotive operators (engineers & firemen)    7.50  Slicing & cutting machine operators 
3.50  Drillers of oil wells    7.67  Painting machine operators 
3.51  Railroad brake, coupler, & switch operators   7.88  Small  engine  repairers 
3.54 Shoe  repairers    7.99  Upholsterers 
3.54  Parking lot attendants    8.23  Janitors 
3.61  Waiter's assistant    8.30  Masons, tilers, & carpet installers 
3.74  Rollers, roll hands, & finishers of metal   8.41  Dressmakers  &  seamstresses 
3.76  Printing machine operators, n.e.c.    8.48  Misc material moving occupations 
3.77  Glaziers    8.95  Butchers & meat cutters 
3.79  Carpenters    9.13  Textile sewing machine operators 
3.84  Sheet metal duct installers    9.78  Plant & system operators, stationary engineers 
3.89  Garage & service station related occupations    9.88  Washing, cleaning, & pickling machine operators 
3.96  Ship crews & marine engineers    10.00  Grinding, abrading, buffing, & polishing workers 
4.01  Heat treating equipment operators    10.84  Industrial machinery repairers 
4.01  Sawing machine operators & sawyers    11.43  Farm workers 
4.02  Auto body repairers    11.77  Gardeners & groundskeepers 
4.05  Office machine operators, n.e.c.    11.95  Hand molders & shapers, except jewelers 
4.08  Crane, derrick, winch, & hoist operators    14.49  Graders & sorters of agricultural products 
4.12  Textile cutting machine operators    14.64  Drillers of earth 
4.21  Patternmakers & model makers    14.79  Typesetters & compositors 
4.25  Garbage & recyclable material collectors    14.96  Laborers outside construction 
4.26  Paving, surfacing, & tamping equipment operators    16.02  Metal platers 
4.29  Cementing & gluing machine operators    16.32  Molders, & casting machine operators 
4.30  Heavy equipment & farm equipment mechanics    16.93  Helpers, surveyors 
4.34  Nail & tacking machine operators  (woodworking)    18.47  Machine feeders & offbearers 
4.50  Furnace, kiln, & oven operators, apart from food    19.18  Vehicle washers & equipment cleaners 
4.54  Cabinetmakers & bench carpenters    19.67  Repairers of household appliances & power tools 
4.60  Lathe, milling, & turning machine operatives    19.77  Bookbinders 
4.61  Precision grinders & filers   19.82  Other  mining  occupations 
4.81  Paper folding machine operators    22.77  Miners 
4.83  Millwrights    26.34  Excavating & loading machine operators 
5.28  Lay-out workers    26.88  Shoemaking machine operators 
5.28  Other precision & craft workers    36.89  Engravers 
5.28  Wood lathe, routing, & planing machine operators    43.87  Fishers, hunters, & kindred 
5.39  Farmers (owners & tenants)   78.22  Paperhangers 
5.47  Precision makers, repairers, & smiths    93.43  Furniture & wood finishers 
5.51  Misc textile machine operators    93.71  Pressing machine operators (clothing) 
5.54  Misc food prep workers    137.14  Operating engineers of construction equipment 
5.55  Extruding & forming machine operators    146.72  Roofers & slaters 
5.66  Painters, construction & maintenance   268.27  Drywall  installers 
5.68 Elevator  operators       
5.73  Construction trades, n.e.c.       
5.75 Construction  laborers       
 